The great and wild mysteries in speculation on Putin’s ideology

Mikhail Suslov and Alexander Baunov say it is the invasion’s very audacity that gives “meaning” to Russia’s war

Last week, historian Mikhail Suslov wrote an interesting essay for Russia.Post that echoes a recent article by Carnegie’s Alexander Baunov — both experts describe a theoretical rationalization for the invasion of Ukraine as the audacity of the war itself (not Russia’s battlefield success). The invasion’s “meaning” is “Russia’s daring attempt to get rid of ‘discursive submission to the West,’” says Suslov, channeling the late writer Anatoly Chernyaev. But the main point of Suslov’s essay is that Putin’s current ideological inspiration comes from Alexander Zinoviev (who kicked the bucket in 2006). Suslov says this is happening amid a “frantic” effort by the Kremlin to “elaborate a new, catch-all ‘frontline ideology.’”

Baunov recently argued that the “insurgent mentality” fueling support for the invasion will forgive almost any battlefield defeats (though I personally doubt this would accommodate the loss of the LDNR or certainly Crimea), and Suslov says that Zinoviev (before he died) saw Putin’s rise to power as “an accidental act of the guerilla war against Westernization.” 

These observations offer interesting ways of making sense of this insane war, but it’s probably wise not to get carried away with the notion that any particular ideology dictates Putin’s actions. In its Signal newsletter, Meduza recently argued (fairly persuasively, I’d say) that the best way to understand Putin’s political rhetoric and flirtations over the years with publicity tactics and ideological principles is that he approaches it all instrumentally. Right now, with the war going poorly, the regime must claim that it’s all unfolding to plan. When Putin’s needs change, so will his “ideology.” (Of course, maybe he’s finally drunk the Kool-Aid and truly believes now — who the hell knows?)